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Case No. 20080158-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah/
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Joe David Bosquez,
Defendant/Appellant.

•

'

• • Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Defendant appeals from convictions for driving under the influence, a third
degree felony, and driving on alcohol restrictions, a class B misdemeanor. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does Defendant's intent to use his car as a dwelling for the night prevent a
conviction for DUI based on actual physical control of a vehicle?
Standard of Review. Because Defendant did not pursue the issue below and
does not argue for any exception to the preservation requirement on appeal, this
Court should not reach the merits of his claim. Hence, no standard of review
applies to this issue.
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2. Has Defendant demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to:
(a) testimony that he was seen operating his car; and
(b) a jury instruction allowing a DUI conviction if he operated his car?
Standard of Review. "' An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law/" State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, \ 16, 247
P.3d 344 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6,89 P.3d 162); State v. Perry, 2009 UT
App 51,1 9,204 P.3d 880. When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim
for the first time on appeal, this Court "will review the claim only 'if the... record is
adequate to permit decision of the issue/" Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, | 36, 203
P.3d 976 (quoting State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027,1029 (Utah 1991)) (omission in
original).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVTSION^^
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2009), and Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, are determinative of the issues discussed herein, and a copy of
each is attached in Addendum A.

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol [DUI], a
third degree felony, and being an alcohol restricted driver, a class B misdemeanor.
R. 5. He waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over as charged. R. 19-20.
On the first day of trial, Defendant entered a no contest plea to the class B
misdemeanor and stipulated that: (1) he had a blood alcohol content of .269 the
night of his arrest; (2) the intoxilyzer was working at the time; and (3) the operating
officer was qualified to use it. R, 65. Trial proceeded on count one, with each side
calling a single witness.1 R. 64. At the close of the evidence, Defendant moved to
dismiss, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was in actual
physical control of the vehicle. R. 64, 81; R. 145:187-88. The court denied the
motion, and the jury found him guilty of DUI. R. 64; R. 145:187-88.
The judge sentenced Defendant to a term of six months in the county jail for
the class B misdemeanor and a concurrent indeterminate term not to exceed five
years in the State prison for the DUI. R. 89-92. The court suspended both terms,
imposed 365 days in jail, and placed Defendant on probation for three years. R. 89-

The State had anticipating calling as an additional witness the store
employee who had called the police, but the employee did not appear for trial. R.
145:194.
3
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92. Defendant timely appealed. R. 97. The appeal was dismissed for failure to file a
docketing statement, but later reinstated. R. 113-14,141.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tlte State's Case.
Detective Jarod Reary was on patrol in Roosevelt the night of November 3,
2006, when he was notified by dispatch around 8:00 p.m. that an employee at Video
& Sound had seen someone drive up to the store, park the car, and pass out. R.
145:148-50. When the detective arrived, an employee stepped outside and pointed
to a 1991 New Yorker parked nearly in front of the store's front door. R. 145:151,
161,167-68,184. A later check of the registration confirmed that Defendant owned
it. R. 145:160-61.
The detective immediately walked over to the car and looked in to discover
Defendant seated in the driver's seat and leaning over, face down, into the
passenger seat, apparently asleep. Id. No one else was in the car. The detective
knocked on the car door several times without getting a response, then opened the
door and tapped on Defendant's leg several times. R. 145:151-52. Defendant
eventually opened his eyes and sat up. Id. When he did, the detective smelled
alcohol coming from inside the car.

R. 145:152, 170. He detective tried to get

Defendant to focus on him, but Defendant did not respond. R. 145:152-53. Instead,
4
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he ignored the officer and stored blankly, seemingly disoriented. Id. Eventually, he
got out of the car, bracing himself for balance, tentatively stood, then moved slowly
to the back of the car with the officer. R. 145:153-54. Defendant did not respond to
the detective's questions, but continued to stare toward him. R. 145:154.
Getting nowhere, the officer turned to look in the car for the keys and found
them in the ignition. R. 145:161, 178. He pulled them out and set them on the
driver's seat, as was his standard practice, because the tow truck driver would need
them when he arrived. R. 145:161-62.
Detective Reary continued questioning Defendant, who was so completely
unresponsive when the detective attempted to walk him through a field sobriety
test, that the detective did not pursue a second test. R. 145:155-56. Instead, he
arrested Defendant and took him to the police station. R. 145:156,158.
Once there, Defendant became a little more responsive. R. 145:159. He
consented to a breath test that placed his blood alcohol content [BAC] at .269
approximately half an hour after Detective Reary first approached Defendant. R.
145:159-60,162-63,178.

5
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The Defense.
Defendant explained that he was drinking beer and winding down from a
work day in "the yard" when he decided to rent some videos "and come back
home" to "kick back at the house, to relax, watch some videos, [and] eat dinner[.]"2
R. 145:171,181-82. Curtis, a co-worker, drove him to the video store in Defendant's
car, but left to go to a bar before the detective arrived. R. 145:181-82. Defendant
tossed the car keys onto the driver's seat before he went to the Maverik next door to
use the bathroom. R. 145:182-83. Then he returned to his car to go to sleep. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The DUI statute provides, in relevant part, that a person "may not
operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . if the person... has a blood
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater

" Utah Code Ann. § 41-

6a-502 (West Supp. 2009). Defendant urges this Court to create an exception to the
statute that permits an intoxicated individual otherwise meeting the statutory
requirement of being in "actual physical control" of a vehicle to escape prosecution
because he lives in his car. However, his claim was not preserved below, and he
fails to argue on appeal that it falls within any exception to the preservation

2

He explained that the yard is "the location of the [drilling] company, where
they have all their oil rigs and — and trucks." R. 145:179-80.
6
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requirement.

Neither does he offer any legal authority for the exception he

advocates. In any event, his argument lacks merit because it lacks record support,
and because Defendant's subjective intent in his use of the car is irrelevant to an
analysis of his actual physical control of the car, which control is abundantly
supported by the record evidence.
Point II. Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction because he claims his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial by failing to object to: 1) allegedly
inadmissible testimony that identified him as the driver of the car; and 2) a related
jury instruction reflecting that he could be convicted if he was found to have
operated the car. Neither argument warrants review, however, because they are
inadequately briefed. In any event, his claims fail because he cannot establish the
requisite prejudice. The evidence overwhelming supports a conviction for being in
"actual physical control" of the vehicle, rendering references to Defendant's actual
operation of his car superfluous. Moreover, the language to which he objects in the
jury instruction appears in another unchallenged instruction, rendering it unlikely
that a successful objection below would have resulted in a more favorable outcome
for Defendant.

7
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ARGUMENT
1

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT USE OF A VEHICLE AS A
DWELLING PREVENTS A FINDING OF ACTUAL PHYSICAL
CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WAS NOT PRESERVED AND, IN
ANY EVENT, LACKS MERIT
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
•5

directed verdict. See Aplt. Br. at 10-13. He argues that because he lived in his car
when he was arrested, it was a dwelling rather than a vehicle and, hence, he could
not be found to have been in actual physical control of a vehicle. Id.
A. Defendant's Claim is Unpreserved.
Defendant did not preserve this argument below. To be preserved for
appellate review, Defendant's argument must be "raised to a level of consciousness
to allow the trial court an adequate opportunity to address it[.]" State v. McDaniel,
2010 UT App 381, % 3, 246 P.3d 162; State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^ 8, 86 P.3d
759.
At the end of the trial, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on an
unspecified basis. R. 145:187-88. Defense counsel simply stated "the State has failed
to make its burden on the element of actual physical control of a vehicle." R.

3

Defendant presents this claim in Point II of his brief. See Aplt. Br. at 10-13.
The State addresses Defendant's two arguments in reverse order herein.
8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

145:187. Defendant did not suggest or imply that the deficiency involved his own
belief that the vehicle was a " dwelling/7 and neither the prosecutor nor the trial
judge interpreted the argument in that manner. Instead, the prosecutor responded
that any factual disputes should be resolved by the jury and that the elements had
been met. Id. The trial court noted that "the primary issue seems to be physical
control[,]... an element of [which] seems to be, where were the keys?" R. 145:188.
That issue of fact, he stated, "should go to the jury[.]" Id. Defendant made no effort
to redirect the court's focus to the status of the car as a dwelling.
Because Defendant did not provide the trial court with an adequate
opportunity to address his dwelling claim below, he is not entitled to appellate
review of the claim absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v.
Petersen, 2010 UT App 38, f 42,227 P.3d 1264 (generally, appellate courts will not
consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on
appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances), cert, denied 238 P.3d 443
(2010). Defendant does not justify appellate review of his argument under either
exception to the preservation rule. Hence, this Court should decline to reach it. See
id.; see also McDaniel, 2010 UT App 381, <j[ 4.

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B. Defendant's Claim Lacks Merit.
In any event, there is no merit to his claim that even though the evidence
suggests that he "could have had actual physical control of the vehicle/' the fact that
he was sleeping in what amounts to his dwelling at the time he was discovered
prevents a determination that he had actual physical control of the car. See Aplt. Br.
at 12-13.
Contrary to his claim, the evidence fully supports a conviction based on actual
physical control of the vehicle. A determination of whether an accused is in actual
physical control of a vehicle requires an examination of the totality of the
circumstances, and a nonexhaustive set of factors has been developed to aid review,
including:
(1) whether [the] defendant was asleep or awake when discovered;
(2) the position of the automobile;
(3) whether the automobile's motor was running;
(4) whether [the] defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle;
(5) whether [the] defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant;
(6) whether [the] defendant had possession of the ignition key;
(7) [the] defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle;
(8) how the car got to where it was found; and
10
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(9) whether [the] defendant drove it there.
State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, f 22, n.4, 89 P.3d 209 (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1993) (quotations and
citations omitted). None of these factors, however, is "dispositive of the question [of
actual physical control of a vehicle] as a matter of law[.]" Barnhart, 850 P.2d at 47778 (citing R z d z ^
Only two of these factors were contested below. The first was the location of
the car keys. Detective Reary testified that he found the keys in the ignition and
placed them on the front seat for the tow truck driver. R. 145:161-62. His written
report supported his memory. R. 145:178. Defendant, on the other hand, testified
that he threw the keys on the driver's seat. R. 145:182-83. However, his memory
was compromised by the stipulated fact that his blood alcohol content that night
measured .269, and by the uncontroverted testimony of Detective Reary describing
Defendant's disoriented affect, blank stares, tentative movements, and sporadic
responsiveness.

R. 145:152-60, 178. In any event, the keys were clearly in

Defendant's possession and readily accessible to him.
The second contested fact was whether Defendant drove the car to the video
store. Defendant claimed at trial that a co-worker had driven him. But Defendant
was found in the driver's seat instead of the passenger's seat. There was no sign of
11
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another person, no mention of another person, and no indication that anyone would
be driving Defendant home once he had time to get his videos. R. 145:164. This
issue is but a single nondispositive factor in the assessment of actual physical
control. See Barnhart, 850 P.2d at 477-78; see also Walker, 790 P.2d at 92-93 ("evidence
that the key was in the ignition . . . is merely a fact - along with the defendant's
presence asleep and intoxicated in the vehicle - which, being capable of establishing
the defendant's actual physical control of the vehicle, precludes the conclusion that
as a matter of law the defendant was not in actual physical control of the vehicle . . .
"') (quoting with approval Fieselman v. State, 537 So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Fla. App. 3d
Dist. 1988)) (italics in original). Even assuming Defendant was not the driver, the
totality of the remaining circumstances overwhelmingly supports a determination
that Defendant had actual physical control of his car.
Here, Defendant was discovered:
—sound asleep;
—alone;
—in the driver's seat;
—of a car he owned;
-smelling of alcohol;

12
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-parked in a parking stall near the front door of a retail video store
during business hours;
-with the motor off;
-and the car's key in the ignition;
-without any barrier to his apparent ability to start and move the car.
The location of the car relative to the storefront and, hence, to the traffic from other
patrons during business hours, suggests a temporary visit to the store rather than
preparation for an uninterrupted night's sleep. This was reinforced by Defendant's
testimony that he had planned to rent videos and return home to watch them. R.
145:181. It also increases the likelihood of harm to others should Defendant in fact
decide to drive the car.
Defendant claims that despite the evidence of his actual physical control of his
car, he was not in violation of the DUI statute because when he was found, he was
using his car as his dwelling. .See Aplt. Br. 10-11,13. He contends that there was
minimal risk of his waking up and driving the car while intoxicated because his
"residence during th[at] week was his car[,]" and his car was "[h]is final destination
that night[.]" See id. at 11,13. His claim fails for two reasons. First, Defendant's
claim lacks record support. Although Defendant testified that his car was his
"home[,]" he also stated that he did not always live in it. R. 145:179-82. He

13
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explained that around the time of his arrest, he lived "mostly" in "the yard" of the
company where he worked, "in [his] car," or at "a pusher's house[.]" He testified
that the night he was arrested, he was "at the yard" where he worked, was
"winding down [and] drinking some beers," and decided to "go rent some videos
and come back home." R. 145:180-81. He said he told a co-worker that he wanted
"to kick back at the house, relax, watch some videos, eat dinner and . . . stuff like
that."

R. 145:182 (emphasis added).

In other words, although Defendant

occasionally lived in his car, on the night of his arrest he set out to rent some videos
and return to where he was staying to watch them, making his final destination "the
house." Even if Defendant was staying in his car at the time instead of in "the
house," his testimony establishes that he did not intend to remain at the video store
but planned to return to "the yard" and watch the videos before settling in for the
night.
Second, Defendant's subjective intent in his use of the car is irrelevant to
assessing actual physical control.

The DUI statute "'is intended to prevent

intoxicated persons from causing harm by apprehending them before they operate a
vehicle.'" Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, f 26 (quoting Bamhart, 850 P.2d at478). The
concern for eliminating the danger presented by intoxicated drivers is sufficiently
high that the statute permits their apprehension even if they do not subjectively
14
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intend to actually exercise any control over the vehicle. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a502; Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, f 26; Bamhart, 850 P.2d at 478. It is the "apparent
ability to start and move the vehicle'" while intoxicated that the statute is designed
to address and discourage. See Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, f 26 (quoting Bamhart,
850 P.2d at 478) (citation omitted).
The risks presented by an intoxicated homeless person who believes himself
to be going to bed in his "home" when he sleeps in his car are the same risks
presented by an intoxicated person who sits or sleeps behind the wheel of a vehicle
instead of driving to his home to sleep it off. In both situations, the intoxicated
person possesses the ability to operate the car at will while unable to do so safely.
Hence, the subjective intent to "go home" for the night by sleeping in the car is not a
realistic barrier to Defendant's ability to operate the car at any time he chooses and
does not exempt him from the scope of the statute.
Defendant attempts to distinguish his case from Richfield City v. Walker, 790
P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), arguing that, unlike here, Walker's "final destination" was
not necessarily his own vehicle. See Aplt. Br. at 11. In that case, an intoxicated
Walker drove to a hotel, got out of his truck, and walked toward the office. Id. at 8889, 93, n.5. He met a guest who told him that the hotel was full. Id. at 93, n.5.
Walker immediately returned to his truck, got into the driver's seat, put a pillow on
15
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the passenger side of the bench seat, laid down, and went to sleep. Id. at 88-89, 93,
n.5. He left the keys in the ignition, his door unlocked, and the headlights on. Id. at
93, n.5. A deputy found him and within thirty minutes administered an intoxilyzer
test that registered his blood alcohol level at .21 %. Id. at 89. He was later found to
be in actual physical control of the vehicle and was convicted of DUI. Id.
Defendant argues that Walker's conviction was justified because he "could
well have hunted for a new hotel" instead of sleeping in his truck but chose not to
do so, while Defendant was living in his car and could not simply find somewhere
else to sleep off the alcohol. See Aplt. Br. at 11. On the contrary, as Defendant
recognized at trial, he had, and intended to exercise, the option of returning to "the
house" and was not prevented from doing so simply due to his subjective belief that
he was going to sleep in his car. R. 145:171,181-82. He was equally as "capable of
driving off as soon as he awakened," as this Court found Walker to be, and hence
was, like Walker, in actual physical control of his car. Walker, 790 P.2d at 93.
Where the relevant facts and circumstances demonstrate without a doubt that
Defendant had an unimpeded ability to start and move his car at any time, the
evidence supported the determination that Defendant had actual physical control
over his car notwithstanding its potential status as his home. See Viatyando, 2004 UT
App 95, If 26.
16
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II
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM IS
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; ALTERNATIVELY, IT FAILS
BECAUSE DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH PREJUDICE
Defendant asks this Court to reverse his conviction because his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance. See Aplt. Br. at 8-10. Specifically, he argues that his
counsel failed to object to alleged hearsay testimony elicited from the arresting
detective and explaining the content of the store employee's report to police. See id.
at 8. Absent this inadmissible hearsay, he claims, there was no evidence that he
drove his car to the store. See id. at 9-10. Accordingly, he contends that his counsel
should have also objected to a jury instruction that advised the jury that they could
convict him if they found that he had driven the car. See id. at 9. Together, these
errors, he argues, prejudiced him by allowing the jury to convict him for actually
driving the car when no such evidence was adduced below. See id. at 10.
A. Ineffective Assistance Standard.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must
establish "(1) 'that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness' and (2) 'that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
have been different.'" State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, f 14,246 P.3d 151 (quoting
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State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, f 19, 206 P.3d 1223) (additional quotation marks
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89,694,1104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). The first prong requires that Defendant"'overcome the strong presumption
that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that
there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.'" Millard, 2010 UT App
355,114 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6,89 P.3d 162) (alteration in original)
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). The prejudice prong
requires that Defendant demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Millard, 2010 UT App 355,114 (quoting State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215,
f 12, 164 P.3d 1258, cert, denied. 106 P.3d 347 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Counsel's failure to object to jury instructions is prejudicial "only if the
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines [the court's]
confidence in the verdict." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, Tf| 20, 23, 20 P.3d 888
(affirming conviction where trial court's refusal to instruct jury on lesser included
offense, though error, did not undermine confidence in verdict). "' [I]t is not enough
[simply] to show that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome
of the trial[.]"' State v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, If 15, 90 P.3d 644 (quoting State v.
Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1987) (alterations herein).
18
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If Defendant fails to meet one prong, this Court need not address the other.
See Millard, 2010 UT App 355, f 15; Petersen, 2010 UT App 38, f 13. Moreover, proof
of ineffective assistance may not be speculative but must be established as a
demonstrable reality. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48,51 (Utah 1998).
B. Defendant's Claim is Inadequately Briefed.
This Court should decline to address this issue because it is inadequately
briefed.

Although Defendant sets out the correct standard of review for an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the remainder of his arguments lack any
citation to relevant legal authority or any meaningful analysis of either the authority
or its effects on the facts of the case. Absent such an analysis, Defendant cannot
establish ineffective assistance as a demonstrable reality.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires a defendant's brief
to "contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on/7 Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled to have
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, | 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Honk, 2002 UT 4, % 67, 57 P.3d 977
(rejecting inadequately briefed claim in death penalty case), cert, denied 537 U.S. 863
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(2002); State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, If 46, n.5,37 P.3d 1073. This rule requires not just
"'citation[] to authority [but] development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority.'" Millard, 2010 UT App 355, Tf 32 (quoting Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, | 46, 70 P.3d 904) (alterations herein)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the
reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritdiett, 2003 UT 24,112,
69 P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis,
... [the court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^12,
52 P.3d 467. This Court simply "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of
whole cloth' on behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,72 n.2 (Utah App.
1990) (citation omitted).

In fact, "Utah courts routinely decline to consider

inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998);
see also Millard, 2010 UT App 355, ^[*[[ 32,38 (refusing to reach inadequately briefed
ineffective assistance claim); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 P.3d 138.
Here, Defendant neither cites nor analyzes relevant authority in support of his
ineffectiveness claims. While the claimed inaction is demonstrated by the record,
Defendant cites no precedent to establish that the inaction fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Neither does he attempt to demonstrate that any
20
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objection raised by trial counsel would have been anything but futile. See State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26,1 P.3d 546; Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51. He simply states that the
"highly damaging inadmissible testimony" "could have been excluded under Utah
Rules of Evidence 801, because it is hearsay not covered by any of the hearsay
exceptions/7 Aplt. Br. at 8-9.

Defendant presents this bald statement without

citation to legal authority or application of the rule to the facts at hand. He neither
acknowledges nor attempts to distinguish the authority holding that such evidence
may be admissible as nonhearsay insofar as it explains the facts and circumstances
of the case, i.e., why the detective appeared at the video store and why he
immediately directed his attention to Defendant's car. See Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38,
f 24 (counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to statements on hearsay
grounds inasmuch as the objection would have been futile where the statements
were admissible as nonhearsay to explain why the initial report was made to police);
see also Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 1987) (officer's testimony
about store clerk's statements to him before he approached the defendant was
nonhearsay as it explained what led the officer to believe that defendant had been
driving while intoxicated). His argument is devoid of discussion of the parties' use
of the challenged evidence in this case, and lacks any explanation why an objection
by his counsel would be anything but futile under this authority.
21
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In addition, Defendant's challenge involving the language of one of the jury
instructions fails to identify the instruction or present any precedent or analysis to
establish that the use of the challenged language under the circumstances herein is
likely to have had any adverse effect on the jury's deliberations or would in any way
result in prejudice.
Where Defendant has failed to cite to pertinent authority or to relevant parts
of the record and provides no meaningful analysis in keeping with that authority,
his claim is inadequately briefed and should not be addressed. See Millard, 2010 UT
App 355, t l 32, 38.
C Defendant's Claims Fail Because he Cannot Establish
Prejudice.
On the merits, Defendant's arguments fail because he cannot establish the
requisite prejudice to support them. See id. at f 19; Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, Tf 22.
Indeed, he offers only general and conclusory statements of prejudice. See Aplt. Br.
at 9-10.
To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, "it is not enough to show
that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the trial but,
rather, defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for
counsel's error, the result would have been different." Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 275
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(quotations and citations omitted). '"A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome/" State v.
Classon, 935 P.2d 524,532 (Utah App.1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see
also Evans, 2001 UT 22, f f 20,23 (the failure of counsel to object to jury instructions
is prejudicial "only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it
undermines our confidence in the verdict/').
Defendant challenges a single jury instruction. Specifically, he objectsto "to
the instruction stating that the defendant could be found guilty if it was found that
they [sic] had driven the vehicle/' Aplt. Br. at 9 (emphasis added). This language
appears to challenge Instruction 10.5, which provides:
You are instructed that the defendant must either "operate" the
vehicle or be in "actual physical control" of the vehicle to be convicted
of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. "Actual physical control"
means the operator being in a circumstance in which he either is
exercising or is in a circumstance in which he could directly begin
exercising "bodily restraint of, directing influence of, dominion or
regulation over a vehicle." In other words, a person who is in a vehicle
in any other posture than as a passenger or a passive occupant,
regardless of the mechanical condition of the vehicle and regardless of
the placement of the vehicle, may be found to be in actual physical
control of the vehicle.
Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to
the determination of whether a person is in "physical control" of a
vehicle. A person may or may not be in actual physical control of a
vehicle if he is in the vehicle and behind the wheel.
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If the defendant was not operating the vehicle or in " actual
physical control" of a vehicle, you must find him not guilty.
R. 70 (emphasis added) (attached in Addendum C).
Even if defense counsel had objected to the highlighted language in this
instruction, there is no reasonable likelihood of any different outcome because the
same language is included in the elements instruction, which is not challenged on
appeal. R. 71 (jury instruction 10) (attached in Addendum C).4
In any event, there is no likelihood of a different outcome from either the
instructional or the testimonial references to Defendant's operation of his car
because under the facts presented at trial, there was overwhelming evidence that
Defendant was in actual physical control of his car. See United States v. Valencia, 907
F.2d 671, 689 (7th Cir. 1990) (a defendant is not prejudiced by an erroneous jury
instruction if there is "no real danger" that defendant was "convicted on the basis of
[that instruction] or that the jury was confused or misled by the instruction."); State
v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, f 14,132 P.3d 703 (no prejudice where the allegedly
erroneous instructions were "superfluous and not the basis of the jury's verdict")
(internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah App
1993) (affirming assault conviction, even though one subsection of assault
4

The same language is also reflected in the elements instruction requested by
Defendant. R. 55 (attached in Addendum C).
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instruction was purportedly erroneous, because there was no evidence that
defendant's behavior fell under that subsection); State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 705
(Utah App. 1990) (ineffectiveness claim fails for lack of prejudice where testimony
to which counsel should have objected was not part of the basis for defendant's
conviction); see also State v. Weddle, 511 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1973) (no error in
instructing the jury on a category of first degree murder that lacked evidentiary
support where there is no likelihood that the jury was misled thereby).
Assuming a timely objection by defense counsel had prevented admission of
the challenged testimony and instructional language, the remaining evidence was
more than adequate to permit conviction on the basis of "actual physical control" of
the car. The evidence below centered almost entirely on facts and circumstances
relevant to establishing the relevant set of factors. See Point IB, supra (discussing the
facts and circumstances relevant to a determination of actual physical control).
Defendant acknowledges as much, noting "an overwhelming lack of evidence"
below to support a conviction for operating the vehicle. See Aplt. Br. at 9. Nearly all
of the evidence was uncontested and weighed convincingly in favor of a finding of
actual physical control, regardless of who drove the car to the video store. See Point
IB, supra.
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Defendant makes no attempt to establish on the facts of this case that his
conviction rested on a finding that he drove to the store, but rather, he contends,
without authority, that the mere availability of that option establishes prejudice. See
id. at 9-10. Given the strength of the State's evidence below, Defendant's conclusory
statements of prejudice fall short of the demonstrable reality required for his claim.
See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51; Weddle, 511 P.2d at 735 (where record evidence "amply
supports" murder verdict on one of three categories submitted to jury, error in
instructing the jury on a different category did not mislead the jury or warrant
reversal).

*

Accordingly, there can be no reasonable probability that, but for the allegedly
erroneous references to Defendant driving his car, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. See, e.g., State v. Reed IV, 2009 UT App 296U, *1 (finding
no prejudice to support ineffective assistance claim for counsel's failure to object to
inclusion of recklessness injury instruction for aggravated sexual assault where "no
reasonable jury would have found that Defendant acted only recklessly" under the
facts of the case). Because Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See Millard, 2010 UT App 355,f19; Wright,
2004 UT App 102, ^f 24 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim for failure to meet
prejudice prong).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted A p r i l ^ / , 2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorneypeneral

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

1 2 1 }
(3 screens)
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
1 1 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos)
1 1 Title V. General Provisions
«*RULE 24. BRIEFS
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief
under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
( a ) ( l l ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
( a ) ( l l ) ( A ) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not
reproduced verbatim in the brief;
( a ) ( l l ) ( B ) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of centra! importance to the determination of the appeal, such as
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
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(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to
the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed,
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except
with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used
in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule l l f f l or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall
be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference
shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving crossappeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed; the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the
issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply
to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed
at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by
a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional
pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding
party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted
or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court., An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the
supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of
filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in
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§ 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if
the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time
of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510.
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 58, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 91, § 1, eff. July 1 2005.
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Addendum B

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ROOSEVELT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ,
-0O0-

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 061000417

Plaintiff,

JURY TRIAL

.vs.
JOE DAVID BOSQUEZ,
Defendant.
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of November,
2007, commencing at. the hour of 9:10 a.m., the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE JOHN R.
ANDERSON, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were
had.
-oOo-
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THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you're

going to get a little short break now.

I'm going to have the

deputy escort you back to the jury room and we'll be with you
in just a few minutes.
Okay.-

At this point, Ms. Miya, I understand you

have a motion.
MS. MIYA:

Your Honor, defense makes a motion for a

directed verdict as the State has failed to make its burden on
the element of actual physical control of a vehicle.
MR. CHARLES:

Your Honor, first of all, I'd object

to the motion being made at this point.

We talked about this

back in chambers and it was with the understanding that if the
motion was going to be made, it was going to be at the time
the State rested.

At this point, the defense is resting and .

now it's just coming up.
THE COURT:

There was some confusion, I think, in

Ms. Miya's mind about the timing on this.

I'm going to let

her proceed.
MR. CHARLES:
MS. MIYA:

Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is that it?

Okay. ..

Response?
MR. CHARLES:
met, your Honor.

I believe that the elements have been

There are some factual disputes, but it

would be the jury's job to resolve those, not the Court's.
187
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THE COURT:

The Court would agree that the primary

1

issue seems to be physical control and that seems to be--an

!

element of that seems to be, where were the keys?

Now, that's

an' issue of fact, I think, should go to the jury, so I'll deny
your motion.
MS. MIYA:
I

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

•

Before we instruct the jury and proceed

with closing arguments, would Counsel like to take a short
break?

I

MR. CHARLES:
MS. MIYA:

Sure.

THE COURT:
MS.- MIYA:
I

I would, your Honor.

Okay.

Let's take a few minutes.

Thank you, your Honor.

(Recess)

i.

THE COURT:

Okay.

We're on the record, State vs. •

Bosquez.
Counsel are present, we're in chambers.

I thought

we'd quickly just go through these and number them, if
i

:

•

anybody's got a problem with the number, we'll talk about it.
And another thing, we're going to have to bifurcate
this.

If- they come back with a guilty verdict, then -we're

going to have to either (A) stipulate to the two or more
prior, or you're going to have to re-open the case and talk
about that.
MR. CHARLES:

We've discussed that.
188
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Addendum Q

INSTRUCTION NO. J D i ^
You are instructed that the defendant must either "operate" the vehicle or be in "actual
physical control" of the vehicle to be convicted of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
"Actual physical control" means the operator being in a circumstance in which he either is
exercising or is in a circumstance in which he could directly begin exercising "bodily restraint of,
directing influence of, dominion or regulation over a vehicle." In other words, a person who is in
a vehicle in any other posture than as a passenger or a passive occupant, regardless of the
mechanical condition of the vehicle and regardless of the placement of the vehicle, maybe found
to be in actual physical control of the vehicle.
*

'

i"

Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to the determination of
whether a person is in "physical control" of a vehicle. A person may or may not be in actual
physical control of a vehicle if he is in the vehicle and behind the wheel.
If the defendant was not operating the vehicle or in "actual physical control" of a vehicle,
you must find him not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11>
Before you can convict the defendant, Joe David Bosquez, of the crime of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, which is alleged to have occurred on or about November 3,
2006, in Duchesne County, State of Utah, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must
believe from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the
following elements of that offense:
1. The defendant, Joe David Bosquez,
2. Did operate a vehicle or was in actual physical control of a vehicle; and
3. That the defendant either:
a. was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of
safely operating a vehicle; or
b. had a breath alcohol concentration of .08 or greater at the time of the operation
or control of the vehicle.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. DEPARTMENT OF ROOSEVELT,
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
JOE DAVID BOSQUEZ,

Case No.: 061000417

Defendant.

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON
)

Defendant, JOE DAVID BOSQUEZ, by and through his attorney of record, hereby
submits the following JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be used at Defendant's trial on November 27,
2007, in the above-referenced lawsuit.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of ALCOHOL RESTRICTED
DRIVER, you must find from the evidence that the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt ALL of the following elements:
1. Joe David Bosquez operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle; AND
2. Joe David Bosquez had any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his
". 'body; AND
3. That such event occu.red within Duchesne County, State of Utah, on or about the
3rd day of November. 2006, although the exact date is immaterial

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the foregoing elements,
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is you- duty to convict the defendant.
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of the elements,
then it is your duty to find the defendant NOT GUILTY.
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